Supervisory forward guidance: the effectiveness of the 2020 euro area supervisory capital relief on the bank credit supply channel

We investigate the effectiveness of the euro area's single supervisory mechanism's capital relief measures in response to the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, in terms of large non-financial corporations' lending outcomes. Using a granular borrower level dataset and controlling for the policies of other euro area authorities, bank characteristics and demand effects, we find that the lifting of the pillar 2 guidance (P2G) capital recommendation had a considerable statistically significant impact in supporting bank credit supply. The results are attributed to both, the capital made available and announcement effects. The latter are generated by the communication of supervisory plans and the fact the P2G was not designed to be ex ante "releasable ". The announcement of granted supervisory flexibility seems to have reduced uncertainty surrounding forthcoming regulatory responses in the beginning of the pandemic and acted as a de facto "supervisory forward guidance " in support of bank business decisions. Going forward we propose the creation of a formal supervisory forward guidance strategy, to complement the existing communication channels, to the benefit of banks' and market participants' decision making during both normal and crisis times. Our work therefore contributes to the literature threefold: (i) it introduces a novel granular supervisory dataset at the borrower level, (ii) it is one of the first papers to take a euro area supervisory perspective in analysing the effectiveness of capital relief measures at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and (iii) it proposes a new supervisory policy instrument, the "supervisory forward guidance " with the goal of informing and steering banks' and market participants' expectations in order to prevent distress episodes.

SHOCKS IN EUROPE, CHANGES IN UNCERTAINTY, AND POLICIES

The COVID-19 pandemic shocks have been an important source of uncertainty on several dimensions. These shocks have influenced the landscape, in which policymakers operate, and have created further uncertainty on policy decisions and on their effectiveness. The aim of this paper is to discuss the impact of this uncertainty on the possible evolution of European economies after the current wave of COVID-19. The emphasis is on the implemented policies.

The limited power of monetary policy in a pandemic

We embed an extension of the canonical epidemiology model in a New Keynesian model and analyze the role of monetary policy as a virus spreads and triggers a sizable recession. In our framework, consumption is less sensitive to real interest changes in a pandemic than in normal times because individuals have to balance the benefits of taking advantage of intertemporal substitution opportunities with the risk of becoming sick. Accommodative monetary policies such as forward guidance result in large increases in inflation but have only limited effects on real economic activity as long as the risk of infection is large. The optimal design of monetary policy hinges on how other tools used to limit virus spread, such as lockdowns, are deployed. If the lockdown policy is conducted optimally, monetary policy should focus on keeping inflation on target. However, if the lockdown policy is not optimal, the central bank faces a trade-off between its objective of stabilizing inflation and the necessity to minimize the inefficiencies associated with virus spread.

How new Fed corporate bond programs cushioned the Covid-19 recession.

In the financial crisis and recession induced by the Covid-19 pandemic, many investment-grade firms became unable to borrow from securities markets. In response, the Fed not only reopened its commercial paper funding facility but also announced it would purchase newly issued and seasoned corporate bonds rated as investment grade before the Covid pandemic. We assess the effectiveness of this program using long sample periods, spanning the Great Depression through the Great and Covid Recessions. Findings indicate that the announcement of corporate bond backstop facilities helped stop risk premia from rising further than they had by late-March 2020. In doing so, these backstop facilities limited the role of external finance premia in amplifying the macroeconomic impact of the Covid pandemic. Nevertheless, the corporate bond programs blend the roles of the Federal Reserve in conducting monetary policy via its balance sheet, acting as a lender of last resort, and pursuing credit policies.